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1Abstract
We study the organization of federations — or international unions — which
decide together the provision of certain public goods. The beneﬁt of centraliza-
tion depends on the internalization of the spillovers, that of decentralization on
the adaptability to local diﬀerences. We individuate as an optimal institutional
design a form of ﬁscal federalism based on decentralization of expenditures and
a system of subsidies and transfers between countries. Since this solution can be
politically unfeasible, we study institutional compromises between a centralized
federation and a decentralized one. “Flexible unions” and federal mandates in
which both the state and federal levels are involved in providing public goods
are typically superior to complete centralization and politically feasible. Finally,
we study the eﬀects of a qualiﬁed majority voting rule in a centralized system:
we ﬁnd that it can be a useful device to correct a bias toward “excessive” union
level activism.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
The European countries are engaged in a process of institution building that is
unprecedented in their history. After the introduction of a single currency in
1999, a Conference to be convened in 2004 is expected to open the door to 12 new
members and introduce a ”Constitutional Charter” for the European Union. Al-
though the word ”federation” does not belong to the EU institutional lexicon1,
the European Union seems to possess key features commonly attributed to fed-
erations; at least if one refers to the classic study by Riker (1964), where a
federation is deﬁned as an arrangement in which individual states or countries
retain considerable sovereignty, while at the same time important prerogatives
are moved to a supranational entity.
Despite its advanced institutional development, however, the European Union
still has some way to go to identify clear, systematic and agreed criteria for al-
locating policymaking prerogatives between national and European authorities.
This is indeed a central issue surrounding the current debate on the future Eu-
ropean Constitution. The building of European institutions originated, in the
early 1950s, from the aim of maintaining security and peace in a continent de-
stroyed by the war2. Subsequently, the project developed into a broader one,
aiming at establishing a single internal market for goods, services, capital and
1The use of this term was ruled out as it proved controversial during the negotiation of the
Treaty of Maascricht; see Padoa-Schioppa (2001).
2See for example Jean Monnet (1976). According to Riker (1964), security and defence are
common motives at the origin of most if not all federations in history.
3people. This was eventually completed in the early 1990s. However, in the
recent decades, as documented by Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2001),
European level institutions have been entrusted with an increasing range of
policy responsibilities.
The question we address in this paper is how alternative institutional ar-
rangements lead to diﬀerent outcomes concerning the centralisation, or decen-
tralisation, of policy responsibilities in a federation, or international union. For
our purpose, we treat the terms ”federation” and ”union” as interchangeable;
in fact, most of our stylised conclusions can equally be applied to the European
Union and to explicitly federal structures, such as the US.
To build our argument, we need a model which implies a need for unions to be
established in the ﬁrst place. We believe that a main reason for which countries
delegate some power to a supernational institution is the need to coordinate
decisions which aﬀect each other. The element that in our view is central to
the political economy of all federations is a tension between the heterogeneity
between countries and the advantage of taking certain decisions in common. As
in Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001, AAE from now on), we deﬁne a union as a
heterogeneous collection of countries that decide together on the provision of a
certain common policy, that exerts positive spillovers on all of them. While we
focus on heterogeneity in preferences over policy, but heterogeneity in economic
fundamentals would have similar eﬀects.3 It is easier to think of this policy as
3See also Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) on this point.
4the provision of a public good, like investment in infrastructures, environmental
quality or defense. However some of our arguments apply also when we interpret
national policies in broader terms (like ﬁscal, monetary or trade policy) or even
as a legal or regulatory framework.
The institutional design of a federation is the fruit of a compromise between
two diﬀerent objectives: the internalization of externalities amongst countries
and the adaptability of policies to diﬀerent national preferences. The beneﬁts
from internalization of externalities increase in the degree of interdependence
between countries, while the beneﬁts from adaptability of the policy increase
with heterogeneity between countries. A union in which every country chooses
independently its policy maximizes the adaptability to local diﬀerences, but
minimizes the internalization of the spillovers, while a union with a uniform
policy for each country assures this internalization but does not take into account
heterogeneity between countries.
In the present paper we investigate various alternative institutional arrange-
ments which are intermediate between these two extremes. In fact, the need for
intermediate institutions is well captured by Oates (1999) in his discussion of
federalism, when he writes that: “individual local governments are presumably
much closer to the people and geography of their respective jurisdictions; they
possess knowledge of both local preferences and cost conditions that a central
agency is unlikely to have. And, second, there are typically political pressures
(or perhaps even constitutional constraints) that limit the capacity of central
5governments to provide higher levels of public services in some jurisdictions than
others. These constraints tend to require a certain degree of uniformity in cen-
tral directives. There are thus important informational and political constraints
that are likely to prevent central programs from generating an optimal pattern
of local outputs”.
Our ﬁrst investigation concerns a form of redistributive mechanism which
is inspired to the way the European Union incentivates investment in national
policies with spillovers in the Community. We label this system as ﬁscal feder-
alism because it leaves complete decisional autonomy to the countries on what
to choose, but it induces them to make the “right” choices through a system of
taxes and subsidies between countries. This system is able to induce the ﬁrst
best policies, but it may be diﬃcult to implement - because of administrative
or political constraints - and it may not be politically feasible.
In the rest of the paper we depart from the rigid structure of the union which
was under study in AAE (2001). We deﬁne a “ﬂexible” union one which is orga-
nized through a two step procedure in which ﬁrst every country provides some
public good and than the federation decides at majority voting on a common
level of federal expenditure. This structure turns out to be an improvement over
the rigid structure. The adoption of federal mandates in which the union ﬁxes
a minimum expenditure for all countries and these can subsequently bottom up
is an other example. Finally, we study the eﬀects of a qualiﬁed majority voting
rule in a centralized system: we ﬁnd that it can be a useful device to correct a
6bias toward “excessive” union level activism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model. Section 3 discusses three alternative institutional rules for the federation.
First we study a federal organization which decentralizes the policy choices at
the national level while constraining them with a system of transfers between
countries and subsidies l. Then we study two mixed systems in which decisions
are partially centralized and partially decentralized: the ﬁrst one captures the
subsidiarity principle, the second one captures the federal mandates. Section
4 focuses on qualiﬁed majority voting and its eﬀects on decisions taken by the
union. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The basic environment is the same as in AAE (2001), and we describe it below.
However, we use it for diﬀerent purposes: in the previous paper we investigated
the equilibrium size of the federation in a simple majority voting institutional
setting. Here we hold the size of the federation constant and we investigate
alternative and realistic institutions.
Consider a federation of N equally sized countries with the population size
normalized at 1. The generic country i has the following objective function:




7where gi is the per capita and total level of government spending in country
i, ci is private consumption which enters linearly in the utility function for sim-
plicity and Hg(·) > 0, Hgg(·) < 0. The parameter αi > 0c a p t u r e sh o wm u c h
the representative individual of country i values public expenditure relative to
private consumption: we will refer to αi a st h ep r e f e r e n c eo fc o u n t r yi and,
without loss of generality, we will assume that countries are ordered such that
α1 ≤ α2 ≤ ···≤ αN−1 ≤ αN. We will assume that these preference parameters
are observable but unveriﬁable information at the federal level. The parameter
β ∈ [0,1] captures the spillover eﬀects from other countries’ government spend-
ing on the “home” country. When β = 1(0) we are in the Samuelson case of a
pure public good at the federal (national) level (see Samuelson, 1955).
We assume that income (y) is exogenously given and equal for everyone in
every country. Each country has a balanced budget, therefore gi = ti ∈ (0,y)
where ti are the lump sum taxes raised in country i. Using the government
budget constraint, we then have




2.1 The utilitarian ﬁrst best
In principle a federation could internalize the spillovers and accommodate diﬀer-
ences in preferences by imposing diﬀerentiated policies for each member. Con-
sider in fact the “utilitarian” case, which seems reasonable since all countries
8have the same income and the same size. From now on we identify the “utili-
tarian ﬁrst best” as simply the “ﬁrst best.” Thus, the optimal choice implies





















gk)=1 ( 4 )
which implies a system of N equations, with solution g∗(αi)i n c r e a s i n gi nαi.
For instance, in the case of isoelastic utility H(g)=
g1−θ
1−θ ,s o l v i n gt h es y s t e m















In this case ∂g∗(αi)/∂β is ambiguous while ∂g∗(αi)/∂αi > 0a n d∂2g∗(αi)/∂α2
i S
0i ﬀ θ T 1.
The “ﬁrst best policy”, which implies a diﬀerent choice for each preference
parameter αi, is not directly achievable because the national preference pa-
rameter αi is not veriﬁable. We know that a complicated mechanism could
implement the ﬁrst best - since preferences are observable - but we will restrict
our attention to simpler, and more realistic, institutional designs which are in-
spired by real world institutions. To establish a benchmark, we will start with
the two simplest arrangements: in the ﬁrst, there is no federation, and every
country independently decides its own public expenditure (extreme decentral-
9ization), in the second the federation decides the same level of expenditure for
all countries (extreme centralization).
2.2 Extreme decentralization: the Nash equilibrium
Consider a federation in which each country independently chooses its own
policy taking as given the policy of all the other countries. In this decentral-
ized equilibrium, assuming interior solutions, the ﬁrst order conditions for a




gj)=1 ( 5 )
Let us call the solution of the system of N equations (5) as gn(αi)w h e r en
stands for Nash equilibrium. This decentralized equilibrium is characterized by
complete adaptability of policies to countries’ preferences, but it is ineﬃcient
because countries do not take into account the eﬀect of their choice abroad: while
the national marginal cost of their investment is unitary, the social marginal cost
is 1/[1 + β(N − 1)],4 which is decreasing in the spillover and in the number of
countries. Due to the free-riding problem, gn(αi) is decreasing in the size of
the externality β and increasing in the preference parameter αi. Moreover, it is
lower than g∗(αi)f o re a c hαi. For instance, under isoelastic utility and assuming
4To verify this, notice that for one unit of expenditure in a country, the same country
obtains one unit of public good and each of the other N −1c o u n t r i e so b t a i nβ units of public
good. But if the social cost of 1 + β(N − 1) units of public good is 1, it must be that the
social cost of 1 unit of public goods is 1
1+β(N−1).














and notice that ∂gn(αi)/∂β < 0, ∂gn(αi)/∂αi > 0a n d∂2gn(αi)/∂α2
i S 0i ﬀ
θ T 1.
2.3 Extreme centralization: the political equilibrium
At the opposite extreme of the options available to the federation is an insti-
tutional set up in which every country has to follow the policy rule chosen at
the federal level. The main cost of this centralized organization is the lack of
adaptability to the diﬀerences between countries, the main beneﬁti st h a tt h e
spillovers between countries can now be internalized at the federal level. This
happens either if the federation acts to maximize its welfare in a utilitarian
fashion, or if countries vote on the federal policy.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which the federal policy is chosen to maximize





Hg{g[1 + β(N − 1)]} =
1
1+β(N − 1)
which equates the average of the marginal utilities from public expenditure to
its social marginal cost. Notice that implementation of this policy requires to
know the average preference parameter.
112.3.1 Simple majority voting
In this section we will assume a simple majority voting rule; we study qualiﬁed
majority voting in section 4. Since preference are single-peaked, the median
voter theorem applies. If αm is the median of αi’s, the chosen policy is gm such
that:












θ{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]}
¶
> 0
where θ(g)=−Hgg(g)g/Hg(g) > 0 is the index of relative concavity. The
comparative statics with respect to the size of the externality β,a n dt h es i z eo f





[1 + β(N − 1)]
µ
1 − θ{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]}
θ{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]}
¶
Hence, the political equilibrium provision of public goods decreases (in-
creases) with the size of the union and of the spillovers if the elasticity of the
marginal utility of public goods is higher (lower) than unity, while, under uni-
tary elasticity we have size-independence. Indeed, under isoelastic utility we
have:
gm = α1/θ
m [1 + β(N − 1)]
1−θ
θ
12The ambiguous eﬀect of an increase in spillovers on the union policy choice is
due to the usual substitution and income eﬀects. But the same argument holds,
more surprisingly for an increase in the number of members. Even if a new
country is strictly in favor of a small government and it will increase votes in
this direction inside the union, its entry could end up determining a bigger size
government: this can happen if the concavity of the function H(·)i sn o tt o o
strong. The intuition is that in this case the substitution eﬀect (more public
goods because they produce more spillovers) more than compensates the income
eﬀect (more consumption because we have already a lot of spillovers). Also the
opposite could happen: the increase in size of the union could end up reducing
t h es i z eo fg o v e r n m e n ti ft h ec o n c a v i t yo fH(·) is strong enough.5
2.3.2 Discussion
The median voter solution, by imposing the same policy to all countries gives
up to the ﬂexibility of the decentralized equilibrium, but internalizes the ex-
ternalities. Given the trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and internalization of the
externalities, this is a “corner” solution, in the sense that it does not allow for
any ﬂexibility in tailoring policies to local preferences. Note that in the absence
of compensatory schemes, the ﬁrst best policy characterized above is not neces-
sarily Pareto superior to the median voter solution. This is because the median
voter (and some members close to the median) may be better oﬀ with the policy
5This result holds for any non separable utility function, but the cut-oﬀ is lower than unity
if public and private goods are complements.










Hence, by concavity of H(·),













for any i (7)
Countries with low preference for the public good obtain more utility from
public expenditure under the political equilibrium. However, countries with
low enough preference for the public good, obtain less consumption under the
political equilibrium than in ﬁrst best (they have to pay higher taxes in the
former). Some countries are better oﬀ under the political equilibrium than
the utilitarian “ﬁrst best.” For instance, the median country obtains the same
utility form public expenditure in both cases - see (7), and it prefers the political
















which happens when the median country favors a large expenditure compared
to the other members of the federation. In this case, the median country and, in
general, some countries around it, would favor the political equilibrium because
it forces other countries to spend more on public goods than in the utilitarian
ﬁrst best case.7 It is also possible that a majority of countries would actually
6Remember that the impossibiltiy of transfers contingent on the preferences makes com-
pensative payments unoperative.
7More precisely, if the value of αi of countries which are the closest in preferences to the
m e d i a nv o t e ro ne i t h e rs i d ea r en o tt od i s t a n tf r o mαm than the median voter is not the only
14prefer the political equilibrium.
The disadvantage of the median voter solution for the union as a whole, is
that it forces all the union members to follow the most preferred policy by the
median, making those who are far from it much less satisﬁed than members
close to the median, if there are no compensations. In the next section we
investigate better institutional arrangements to study when they are eﬃcient
and politically feasible.
3 Institutional design of a federation
In this section we will study diﬀerent institutional rules and compare their
properties. In many cases these institutions resemble procedures adopted in
some areas from the European Union.
3.1 Tax and subsidy schemes
Fiscal federalism is a system of decentralized decision making on public ex-
penditure ﬁnanced both through local decentralized taxation and a net of in-
tergovernmental taxes and grants. In his classic book, Oates (1972) states a
Decentralization Theorem for which “in the absence of cost-savings from the
centralized provision of a good and of interjurisdictional externalities, the level
of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-eﬃcient
country which is better oﬀ in the political equilibrium.
15levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uni-
form level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions”. Since in our
model there are externalities, the theorem does not apply, but we will show that
af o r mo fﬁscal federalism with redistribution between countries is still optimal
in our set up.8
In this section we study a simple system of taxes and subsidies which is
inspired to the way the European Union incentivates certain regional investment.
Indeed, certain kinds of investment, especially those located in poorer regions,
aimed at their development or to environmental protection and characterized
by spillovers on the Community, is subsidized by the European Union:9 for each
Euro devoted to it, a supplementary fraction is added by the Union.
Suppose that for every unit of income allocated by country i to public ex-
penditure, the union adds si units of public expenditure. These subsidies are
ﬁnanced with taxes Tj for j =1 ,...,N. By assumption, both si and Ti must
be independent from the preference parameter of country i, αi, but they do
not need to be the same in all countries. In particular, they could depend on
each of the public expenditures, g1,...,gi,...,gN, and we will assume that they
8Indeed, Oates (1999) notes that “intergovernmental grants constitute a distinctive and
important policy instrument in ﬁscal federalism that can serve a number of diﬀerent functions.
The literature emphasizes three potential roles for such grants: the internalization of spillover
beneﬁts to other jurisdictions, ﬁscal equalization across jurisdi c t i o n s ,a n da ni m p r o v e do v e r a l l
tax system” (italics added).
9A big part of the European Union budget, about 35% (see Nava, 2000) is devoted to these
“Structural Expenditures”.
16are diﬀerentiable in these variables. Hence, we can write the problem of each





gi [1 + si(g1,...,g i,...,gN)]+
+β
PN
























where we assumed an interior solution for each country. Despite the complexity
of this diﬀerential system, we can derive the optimality of a very simple system
of taxes and subsidies.
Proposition 1. The ﬁrst best allocation of public expenditure can be achieved
if the federation complements national public expenditure by a fraction s∗ =












Proof: see the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is quite simple. The additional expenditure
in the public good which is provided by the union distorts the incentives to
invest in the public good. These incentives are the same for every country as
in the ﬁrst best if the marginal cost of public expenditure equates its social
marginal cost. But we know that this is the same for every country and given
17by 1/[1+β(N −1)], hence this equality is trivially satisﬁed when ∂Ti
∂gi = 0 while
s is as speciﬁed in Proposition 1 for all countries, so that ∂si
∂gj =0f o ra n yj:t h e
subsidy alone can be chosen so as to implement the right allocation of public
expenditure. Indeed, in the Appendix we show that:
gi[1 + β(N − 1)] = g∗
i i =1 ,...,N

























One way to choose taxes so as to satisfy this revenue constraint is closely
related to the Clark-Grove-Vickrey mechanism studied in mechanism design
under a quasi-linear environment. Since we did not need to constraint ∂Ti
∂gj to






Clearly, the tax of each country is independent from its own expenditure and
























18problem is to share equally the cost of subsidies by adopting taxes:
T∗









Since preferences are observable, this tax can be directly calcolated and it clearly
satisﬁes the revenue constraint.
In every case, the optimal subsidy is independent from the utility functions
and the distribution of preference parameters: we can obtain the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o -
cation of public expenditure just by knowing what is the size of the spillovers.
The optimal subsidy is the product of this and the number of countries, inde-
pendently from the details of the model: all of them end up in transfers between
countries.
3.2 Discussion
An important feature of the optimal mechanisms we have just studied is that,
while they induce the optimal investment in public goods by each country, in
general, they do not replicate the exact allocation of consumption of the utili-
tarian ﬁrst best. Given the linearity in consumption of our objective function,
this is consistent with optimality - the welfare function (3) is still maximized -,
but it is clear that departing from this quasi-linear environment we would loose
the optimality property of such a mechanism.
In both the particular cases studied in the previous subsection, countries with
high public expenditure receive high subsidies but pay less than proportionally
for them (indeed, their taxes are independent from their own expenditure):
19borrowing the mechanism design jargon, this is the “rent” that we need to leave
to the players for whom the right action is more costly. The consequences of this
is that countries with high preference for public expenditure end up with higher
utility than in the utilitarian optimum: indeed, their expenditure is subsidized
by countries with low preferences for public expenditure.11 In theory, lump
sum transfers between countries could reestablish the utilitarian allocation of
consumption while preserving the one of the public goods, but unveriﬁability of
the preference parameters prevents this from being feasible.
This is not just a technical problem for our mechanism. Countries with low
preference for the public good may end up being worse oﬀ than under the decen-
tralized Nash equilibrium, which would make pointless their same adhesion to
the union. Also, if income is low enough, some countries may not even be able
to pay their transfer, which would directly make unfeasible the all mechanism.
Typically, the imposition of individual rationality constraints would make im-
11For instance, in the case with T∗
i = β
P
j6=i gj,f o rc o u n t r yi utility from this mechanism
is lower than in the optimal utilitarian case if and only if:



















that is, if its public expenditure is below the average in the union. It is easy to verify that
exactly the same condition emerges when taxes are equal for all countries.
20possible the attainment of the ﬁr s tb e s tw i t hs u c ham e c h a n i s me v e nu n d e ro u r
quasi-linear speciﬁcation. But even if this was not the case, the implementation
of the redistributive mechanism we have just described, seems quite diﬃcult to
sustain from a political point of view, especially in a federation of otherwise
identical countries.
Finally we need to remember that despite the ﬁrst best could be achieved,
there may not be a majority in the federation which supports it (remember that
compensatory payments would not be feasible since they should be contingent
on the preference parameters).
For these reasons we now return to political concerning issues. In the next
two sections we study two diﬀerent institutional arrangements based on majority
voting in the union which add ﬂexibility to the political equilibrium previously
studied.
3.3 Flexible unions
In section 2.3 we have assumed that the political process in the federation decides
a unique level of the public good for all members. A potentially more eﬃcient
structure is to allow countries to choose and independently ﬁnance public ex-
penditure and to have an additional federal provision of the public good which
is decided by the union. This complementary role of the federation depicts a
well known feature of the European Community constitution, the subsidiarity
principle. For instance, as the Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty says that “In
21areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suﬃciently achieved by
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or eﬀects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”. In other words, public
policies should be assigned to the lowest level of government which is capable
to succesfully achieve their objectives (see Inman and Rubenfeld, 1998). In our
model we have exactly a situation were each member’s policy does not inter-
nalize the eﬀects on the other members and so it cannot suﬃciently achieve
its objectives. Hence, the subsidiarity principle implies that the union should
complement countries’ expenditure in the public good with an additional ex-
penditure at the union level.
We will refer to a union adopting this principle as to a “ﬂexible union”
compared to the rigid one considered in the case of extreme centralization, in
which every country had to adopt the same policy. Formally we will describe
a ﬂexible union with N countries and median αm, assuming that the median
country chooses an union expenditure gU
m ,12 while each country i chooses gn
i ∈
12We focus on the natural case in which single-peakedness according to the α-ordering holds
in the second stage. We cannot exclude the existence of other subgame perfect equilibria in
which single peakedness does not hold. However, the nature of the equilibrium would be
qualitatively similar.
22(0,y− gU
m ). Utility for country i is now:










m [1 + β(N − 1)]

 (10)
The timing assumption in our description of the principle of subsidiarity is that
the countries choose their individual public expenditure in a ﬁrst stage, and the
union decides a complementary expenditure in a second stage.13 In particular,
the median country will choose gU
m to maximize Um. Given the expectation
E(gU
m ), all the countries in the ﬁrst stage choose gn





1,2,...,N,t om a x i m i z eUi. In equilibrium it must be E(gU
m )=gU
m . Given this,


































[1 + β(N − 1)]
(12)
13Our modeling strategy on ﬂexible unions may remind of the theory on budgetary proce-
dures and agenda setting rules in presence of common pool problems al aPersson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997, 2000). However, in that literature the multi-stage budgeting was separating
the problems of the size of the budget and its allocation, while in our model there is not an
overall budget to decide. Moreover, there, each player prefered a bigger share of public expen-
diture, here the opposite holds because of positive externalities between the players. Finally
our purpose is not to do comparative politics at a horizontal level - e.g. executive versus leg-
islative powers or presidential versus parliamentary systems -, but to do comparative politics














as a function increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing







[1 + β(N − 1)]

























m (αm,0) and that αiHg(·) < 1
for any i ≤ m. We can summarize our ﬁndings as follows:
Proposition 2. In a ﬂexible union 1) the federal expenditure is lower than
the one adopted by a rigid union, 2) the median country and all countries with
weaker preferences for the public good do not add any individual expenditure
and 3) the countries with strongest preferences for the public good add individual
expenditure.
Proposition 3. In a rigid union, the adoption of a ﬂexible structure is
Pareto-eﬃcient and unanimously supported.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The outcome under the ﬂexible union is a compromise between the decentral-
ized one and the rigid one. Countries with preferences for a small government
24w i l ls p e n dl e s st h e ni nar i g i du n i o n ,w h i l eb e n e ﬁting from the additional ex-
penditure of countries with opposite preferences: hence they are better oﬀ.T h e
median country must be better oﬀ b e c a u s ei ti sa l w a y sa b l et or e p l i c a t et h e
public expenditure of the rigid system (with the opportunity to be better oﬀ if
some countries provide further expenditure). Hence a strict majority is in favor
of the ﬂexible system. The other countries on one side are worse oﬀ because
the union is providing less public good and on the other side they are better oﬀ
because to some extent they can individually repair to this. It turns out that
the second eﬀect is prevailing under any circumstances. Hence, everybody is
better oﬀ under the ﬂexible union. Thus, even if in a rigid union a reform in
favor of the utilitarian optimum or ﬁscal federalism is not politically feasible,
we have found a Pareto-eﬃcient reform which is always politically feasible. An
important feature of this reform is that it does not rely on any information
about the preferences of the countries.
The feasibility of ﬂexible unions depends to a large extent on the nature
of the policy arena. For certain cases this arrangement seems feasible; think
for instance of the provision of public goods such as infrastructures, defense,
research, etc. The same applies to aspects of regulation, taxation and labor
market policies. In other areas the nature of the policy may make a ﬂexible
union impractical; it is hard to adopt “a little bit” of the common currency,
although Britain may be trying. The general point is, however, that by adopting
“minimum common denominator” approach, the combination of union level and
25national level policy choices can achieve Pareto improvements, relative to the
“rigid” union.
3.4 Federal Mandates
A related institution is one in which each country could choose and indepen-
dently ﬁnance public expenditure on top of the one decided by the federation.
We can think of the situation in which the federation moves ﬁrst as a description
of federal mandates:14 the choice of the union will be the minimum amount of
public good that each country has to provide. In our context we prove in the
Appendix that the subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by the system:
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m [1 + β(N − 1)]













1+β( ˜ N − 1)
i
[1 + β(N − 1)](1 − β)
so that ˜ N countries add individual public expenditure to the amount gU
m decided
as the federal mandate. More precisely we can show:
Proposition 4. The adoption of a federal mandate implies that 1) the federal
mandate is lower than the public expenditure adopted by the rigid union, 2) the
14Cremer and Palfrey (2000) have studied this kind of federal mandates, however in their
model there are not externalities between countries. In our model, instead, the federal man-
date accomplishes an important role: it limits the free-riding of the decentralized equilibrium
internalizing to some extent the externalities produced in public good provision.
26median country and all countries with weaker preferences for the public good do
not add any individual expenditure and 3) the countries with strongest preference
for the public good add individual expenditure.
Proof: see the Appendix.
Even if the adoption of federal mandates in a rigid union may be Pareto-
eﬃcient and unanimously supported, as it was true for the ﬂexible structure, it
may be the case that some country is made worse oﬀ. However we can prove
the following encouraging result:
Proposition 5. In a rigid union there is always a majority in support of
federal mandates.
Proof: see the Appendix.
In subgame perfect equilibrium, the union requires every country to provide
a minimum amount of public expenditure, and some countries complement it
with further expenditure. Even if there is always a majority in support of federal
mandates, in this case we cannot exclude that some countries with stronger
preference for the public expenditure than the median are made worse oﬀ by
their adoption. The reason is that the advantage of the ﬁrst move for the union
as represented by the median country induces an additional free riding (this
time at the union level) which may be deleterious for those countries.
274Q u a l i ﬁed majority voting
Deﬁne “qualiﬁed majority voting” rule (QMV) a situation in which, in order to




Unanimity is a special case of QMV in which Q = N. Simple majority voting
is again a special case of QMV, where Q approaches N/2. Hence, the results
we derived in previous sections under simple majoriry rule all obtain here as a
special case. But the implications of QMV are of particular importance in the
context of the European Union. The European Union Treaty stipulates that
unanimity in the EU Council is needed to entrust policy-making powers to the
EU in a certain number of key areas. In other areas, QMV is suﬃcient. A livey
debate has developed on the possibility of extending the range of areas where
QMV applies, correspondingly reducing the scope of unanimity.
Under QMV, no single policy outcome unambiguously emerges from the
vote. The outcome is indeterminate within a set of policies each of which can-
n o tb ed e f e a t e db yQ M Vb ya n yo t h e r .T h ea m b i g u i t yi sr e s o l v e do n l yb yt h e
agenda setter, that decides which alternatives are put to vote. We can however
characterize this set. The following proposition highlights the policy implica-
tions of diﬀerent super majority rules; a more rigorous treatment is provided in
the Appendix.
Proposition 6. Under a qualiﬁed majority voting rule with quorum Q, there
exists a “winning set” of public good provisions which cannot be defeated against
28an alternative option. This set collapses to the political equilibrium provision
under simple majority voting, gm, when Q =1 /2. Assume that the alternative
option is the maximum provision unanimously supported against no provision,
go: then, the lower bound of the winning set is decreasing in the required majority
from gm to go and the upper bound is increasing in the required majority for Q
small enough and decreasing for Q big enough.
Proof: see the Appendix.
The intuition behind this proposition is that moving from unanimity to less
binding forms of qualiﬁed voting tends to make the union more centralized,
i.e. the provision of public good by the union “is likely to” increase while the
amount of good provided individually (and the number of countries doing so)
“is likely to” decrease. As Q declines further towards N/2, beyond a certain
point the set of policies prevailing under QMV simply shrinks: as the quota
approaches simple majority, the dominant policy must converge to that chosen
by the median voter. The word “likely” above expresses the presumption that,
if both the lower and the upper bounds of the winning set move up, the outcome
will also move up (or vice versa).
Moreover, the introduction of QMV would imply that the number of coun-
tries individually providing the public good and the total amount of public good
individually provided are increasing functions of Q, if and only if the QMV out-
come gU moves in the opposite direction to Q.
294.1 Discussion
The discussion about voting rules and super majority becomes even more heavily
loaded if countries have diﬀerent size. In this case the question is which weight
should be given to each country. Obviously the resulting policy decision would
d e p e n do nt h ec h o i c eo fw e i g h t s .
One possible rule is that the voting share of each country is proportional
to the share of the population. Since we are assuming that income per capita
is the same everywhere, population weights are identical to GDP weights. If
income per capita is diﬀerent, that would not be the case.
Let’s continue to assume that individuals in each country have the same α,
so, trivially, αi represent the median preferences of members of country i. Then,
with population weights the median of the federation (αm) coincide with the
median preference of the citizens members of the union. If, instead, the voting
scheme favors small countries (like the current EC voting system) than one has
a “bias” in favor of the preferred government size of small countries. Alesina
and Wacziarg (1998) ﬁnd that the share of government over GDP is decreasing
with the size of the country measured by population or by total GDP.15 Thus,
voting schemes that favor small countries would produce an α for the union
government higher than the median α of the population of the union.
Consider now the case in which within each country individuals have diﬀerent
15Note however, that these results are drawn from independent countries, not from countries
in a union.
30preferences, i.e. there exists within each country a distribution of α such that
αi is the median of the distribution of α in country i. If each country in the
union is represented by its median voter, and if the union adopts population
weights, then the median of the union deﬁned as the median of country medians,
coincides with the median preference of the citizen of the union.
In practice, country representative in federation level institutions may not
represent the median of their population, particularly in non-proportional sys-
tems. In this case the median of the individual countries’ representative in the
union do not coincide with the median of the population of the union. Alesina
and Grilli (1992) using electoral result from the late eighties, show that the me-
dian of EU institutions (like the Council of Ministers) can deviate signiﬁcantly
from the median of European voters.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we study how alternative institutional arrangements lead to dif-
ferent outcomes concerning the centralisation, or decentralisation, of policy re-
sponsibilities in a federation.
We show three main results. The ﬁrst one concerns the possibility of achiev-
ing the ﬁrst best coordination of policies within a union. We have shown how
this is possible with a mechanism of transfers and taxes or subsidies. However
we also point out many political and administrative limitations of this solution.
31The second result is that even in policy arena where externalities are high,
a“ ﬂexible” union in which both national and super national institutions are
involved in choosing policies is superior to a “rigid” one in which the union
level institutions have full control of policy decision. We also investigate the
properties of alternative rules regulating the relationship between diﬀerent levels
of governments like the adoption of federal mandates.
Finally, we analyse the implications of qualiﬁed majority voting (as opposed
to unanimity of simple majority rules) in our federal context. We show that
moving from unanimity to qualiﬁed majority voting tends to lead to greater
centralisation. Moreover, adopting qualiﬁed (as opposed to simple) majority
voting can correct against certain biases towards excessive centralisation that
arise in some cases. In AAE (2001), we point out one of such cases, which leads to
sub optimally small federations. The idea that once the union is formed, based
upon the expectation of a certain level of centralization, a majority of members
around the median have an incentive to centralize more. In anticipation of this
eﬀect, fewer countries will join to begin with, leading to federations that are
too small from the start. We show, in this paper, that qualiﬁed majority voting
poses limits on the policy involvement of the union. Hence, in the presence of
the bias discussed above, super majorities may be welfare improving.
326A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
The proof is composed of three steps. First, we rewrite the system of opti-
mality conditions, and than we show that the proposed mechanism induces an
identical equilibrium system. Finally we verify that the proposed mechanism
also satisﬁes budget balance.

































































gi[1 + β(N − 1)] + β
X
j6=i







Since the two systems are identical they must have the same solutions:
gi[1 + β(N − 1)] = g∗
i i =1 ,...,N
33Finally budget balance is satisﬁed because:
N X
i=1

















hence the proposed mechanism is feasible and it implements the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o -
cation of public expenditure. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Consider the diﬀerence between utility from the equilibria under a ﬂexible
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m [1 + β(N − 1)] = gm[1 + β(N − 1)]. Hence, for all countries i ≤ m and
the other countries for which gn
i =0 ,i tm u s tb eΦ(αi)=gm − gU
m > 0( b y
Proposition 2.1) and Φ0(αi)=0 .
Now, let us consider the countries for which gn









m [1 + β(N − 1)]




























m [1 + β(N − 1)]



















m [1+β(N−1)] = gm[1+β(N−1)]
It follows that Φ0(αi) > 0, and hence, every country is better oﬀ under the
ﬂexible union. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
Let us consider the case of federal mandates, in which the union moves ﬁrst.














the expectation of the sum of the individual expenditures of all the countries, to
maximize Um. Then, all the countries choose gn
i , i =1 ,2,...,N, to maximize Ui.








j . Given this, the equilibrium
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Notice that for a given gU
m ,t h eﬁrst N equations deﬁne gn
i = gn(αi,gU
m )a s
functions increasing in the ﬁrst argument and decreasing in the second one






m ∈ (1,1+β(N −1)].17 This
16In this case, it can be veriﬁed that single-peakedness always holds in the ﬁrst stage.
17We are implicitly assuming that gU
m > 0 .o t h e r w i s ew ew o u l db eb a c ka tt h ed e c e n t r a l i z e d
equilibrium.









m (αm,0), and that 2) αiHg(·) < 1f o r
any i ≤ m. Finally, 3) positive individual provision is chosen by all countries to








m [1 + β(N − 1)]

 =1
Now, by totally diﬀerentiating the equilibrium ﬁrst order condition for the in-




















































where ˜ N i st h en u m b e ro fc o u n t r i e sw i t hαj > αb, that is the number of countries









˜ N[1 + β(N − 1)]
h
1+β( ˜ N − 1)
i
Finally, substituting in the equilibrium condition for the federal choice of the












1+β( ˜ N − 1)
i
[1 + β(N − 1)](1 − β)
18Obviously, if αb > αN, we are back to the equilibrium with a rigid union.
36whose right hand side is strictly greater than 1
1+β(N−1) as long as ˜ N ≥ 1. Hence,
in this case, comparing the last equation with (6) we conclude that:
gU





m [1 + β(N − 1)] <g m[1 + β(N − 1)]
that is gU
m <g m. Q.E.D
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
Let us deﬁne the diﬀerence between utility from the equilibria under a union
adopting the federal mandate and under a rigid union as ˜ Φ(αi). Consider the
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which clearly implies ˜ Φ(αi) ≥ 0 ∀ i ≤ m. Hence there is a strict majority in
favor of the union. Q.E.D
Remark. With federal mandates we do not have necessarily unanimous




















































− H{gm[1 + β(N − 1)]}


which is negative for αi close enough αm.
37Proposition 6.
Suppose the provision of gUis decided by qualiﬁed majority, i.e., a majority
Q : N, where 1 ≥ Q/N > 1/2, is required to beat a given default option. Then:
(i) For each Q : N, there is a corresponding ”Dominant Set” of options DQ





Q are the options preferred respectively by
the N − Qth and the Qth country (ranked in increasing order of α). gU
N−Q
increases and gU
Q decreases as Q decreases between N (unanimity) and N/2
(simple majority). DQ collapses to the median option as Q approaches N/2.
(ii) Let g0 b et h em a x i m u mv a l u eo fgU that is unamimously supported
against gU =0 . This “consensus option” under weak assumptions is strictly
positive (g0 > 0). Let this be the default option to be challenged by an alter-
native gU >g 0 by a majority Q : N.T h e n , f o r e a c h Q : N,ac o m p a c t
“g0-Dominant” set ZQ ≡ {g0;...;xU
Q} exisis for which all gU ∈ ZQ beat g0 by a
majority Q : N.M o r e o v e r ,xU
Q is a decreasing function of Q.
(iii) Let WQ = DQ∩ZQ.T h e n ,WQ is the set of options that beat g0 and that
cannot be beaten by any other by a majority Q : N. We call this (intersection
of the Dominant and the g0-Dominant sets) the ”Winning Set”. The Winning
Set includes all options that will emerge as winners if, starting from unanimity,
QMV is applied, one time or repeatedly, with the same quorum Q : N.T h e
winning option within WQ is indeterminate. Then:
(a) For Q above a cutoﬀ Q, both the lower and upper bounds of the Winning
38Set increase as Q decreases.
(b) For Q below the cutoﬀ Q, the lower (upper) bound of SQ increases (de-
creases) as Q decrease. The set WQ collapses to the median option as Q ap-
proaches N/2.
(c) Q corresponds to the majority quorum for which maxWQ =m a xZQ.
Proof. The properties of QMV have been ﬁrst analysed by Black (1948), un-
der the assumption that preferences are single-peaked. Proposition 6(i) follows
directly from Black’s Lemma 5. Intuitively, under single-peaked preferences
only options located at the extremes can be beaten, because they can gather
suﬃcient opposition from voters located at the opposite extreme. Options lo-
cated around the center can never be beaten if the quorum is large enough.
Hence there is a compact Dominant Set DQ, located around the centre, that
can never be beaten by QMV by any alternative option. DQ tends to shrink as
the quorum declines from N to N/2. For Q → N/2, the median voter theorem
applies.
Part 6(ii) follows from Black’s (1948) Theorem 13(b). The “g0-Dominant”
set is given by ZQ ≡ {g0;...;xU
Q},w h e r exU
Q is deﬁned as the option that is equiv-
alent to g0 for the “marginal country”, i.e. the country with lowest preference
for the public good within the qualiﬁed majority19. Intuitively, all countries
that belong to that majority will support all options in ZQ against g0.A s Q
decreases, the marginal country will be characterised by a stronger preference
19Such option must exist by assumption of single-peakedness of individual preferences.
39for the public good, hence shifting xU
Q to the right.
To prove Part 6(iii-a), we ﬁrst show that WQ i sn o ta ne m p t ys e tf o rQ
close to (and below) N. We need to show that around (and below) N, xU
Q >
gU
N−Q. We know that gU
N−Q is the preferred option by the marginal country,
while xU
Q is, for the same country, the option that is equivalent to g0.S i n c e
gU
N−Q >g 0 (otherwise, gU
N−Q would be unanimously supported), xU
Q >g U
N−Q
by assumption of single peakedness, and WQ is non empty. Hence, for large
enough Q, WQ = {gU
N−Q;...;xU
Q}, and the rest of Proposition 6(iii-a) follows
directly from 6(i) and 6(ii).
So show Proposition 6(iii-b) it is suﬃcient to note that, since gU
Q decreases
with Q, there is a cutoﬀ point Q below which WQ = DQ.T h i sc u t o ﬀ point is
deﬁned by xU
Q = gU
Q,o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,m a xWQ =m a xZQ. QED.
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